We present the first hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) system that has full security for more than a constant number of levels. In all prior HIBE systems in the literature, the security reductions suffered from exponential degradation in the depth of the hierarchy, so these systems were only proven fully secure for identity hierarchies of constant depth. (For deep hierarchies, previous work could only prove the weaker notion of selective-ID security.) In contrast, we offer a tight proof of security, regardless of the number of levels; hence our system is secure for polynomially many levels. Our result can very roughly be viewed as an application of Boyen's framework for constructing HIBE systems from exponent-inversion IBE systems to a (dramatically souped-up) version of Gentry's IBE system, which has a tight reduction. In more detail, we first describe a generic transformation from "identity based broadcast encryption with key randomization" (KR-IBBE) to a HIBE, and then construct KR-IBBE by modifying a recent construction of IBBE of Gentry and Waters, which is itself an extension of Gentry's IBE system. Our hardness assumption is similar to that underlying Gentry's IBE system.
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Introduction
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a public-key encryption scheme where one's public key can be freely set to any value (such as one's identity): An authority that holds a master secret key can take any arbitrary identifier and extract a secret key corresponding to this identifier. Anyone can then encrypt messages using the identifier as a public encryption key, and only the holder of the corresponding secret key can decrypt these messages. This concept was introduced by Shamir [18] , a partial solution was proposed by Maurer and Yacobi [17] , and the first fully functional IBE systems were described by Boneh and Franklin [5] and Cocks [11] .
IBE systems can greatly simplify the public-key infrastructure for encryption solutions, but they are still not as general as one would like. Many organizations have an hierarchical structure, perhaps with one central authority, several sub-authorities and sub-sub-authorities and many individual users, each belonging to a small part of the organization tree. We would like to have a solution where each authority can delegate keys to its sub-authorities, who in turn can keep delegating keys further down the hierarchy to the users. The depth of the hierarchy can range from two or three in small organizations, up to ten or more in large ones. An IBE system that allows delegation as above is called Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE). In HIBE, messages are encrypted for identity-vectors, representing nodes in the identity hierarchy. This concept was introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [16] , who also described a partial solution to it, and the first fully functional HIBE system was described by Gentry and Silverberg [14] .
The security model for IBE and HIBE systems postulates an attacker that can adaptively make "key-reveal" queries, thereby revealing the decryption keys of identities of its choice. The required security property asserts that such an attacker still cannot break the encryption at any identity other than those for which it issued key-reveal queries. (Or in the case of HIBE, other than those for which it issued key-reveal queries or their descendants.)
For the first IBE and HIBE systems, the only known proofs of security are carried out in the random-oracle model. Canetti et al. [9] introduced a weaker notion of security called selective-ID, where the attacker must choose the identity to attack before the system parameters are chosen (but can still make adaptive key-reveal queries afterward). They proved that a variant of the Gentry-Silverberg system is secure in this model even without random oracles. Boneh and Boyen described a more efficient selective-ID HIBE [1] , and later described a fully secure IBE system without a random oracle [2] . Waters [21] described what is currently the most practical adaptively-secure HIBE system without random oracles.
All currently known fully-secure HIBE systems, however, suffer from loose security reductions (whether they use random oracles or not). Specifically, they lose a multiplicative factor of Ω(q/ ) in the success probability, where q is the number of key-reveal queries and is the depth of the identity hierarchy. This means that asymptotically these reductions can only be used for hierarchies of constant depth. When considering concrete parameters, these reductions are only meaningful for hierarchies of depth two or three.
Gentry [13] proposed the first adaptively-secure IBE system without random oracles that has a tight reduction to its underlying hard problem. Recently Gentry and Waters extended Gentry's IBE to construct an adaptively-secure identity based broadcast encryption (IBBE) system without random oracles [15] , whose security is tightly based on a related hard problem. Our HIBE system builds on the Gentry-Waters system. Boyen [8] proposed a framework for constructing HIBE systems from exponent-inversion IBE systems. Specifically, Boyen described some properties of pairing-based IBE systems (called parallel IBE and linear IBE), and proved that an IBE system with these properties can be transformed to HIBE with comparable security. Boyen noted that Gentry's IBE does not quite fit within this template, and left it as an open problem to construct a HIBE system from Gentry's IBE system. Our system, which solves this problem, does not quite fit within Boyen's framework, yet our approach owes much to Boyen's idea.
We construct the first fully-secure HIBE with a tight proof of security. Namely, ours is the first HIBE system that can be proven fully secure for more than a small constant number of levels. As for the systems of Gentry [13] and Gentry-Waters [15] , we exhibit a tight reduction, albeit to a problem whose instances are of size linear in q + . This solves an open problem posed in [14, 1, 2, 21, 3, 13, 8 ].
Loose and Tight Reductions
On a high level, the reason that most IBE systems have loose reductions is that those reductions involve the following trade-off: For each identity ID, either the simulator knows a decryption key for ID, or it doesn't. If it knows a key for ID then it does not learn anything new if the adversary chooses ID as the target identity to attack, since it could have used the decryption key to learn the same information. And if the simulator does not know a decryption key for ID then it must abort if the adversary makes a key-reveal query for this identity.
The crucial difference in the security proof of Gentry's IBE [13] is that there are many different decryption keys for each identity, and the simulator knows a small subset of these keys. Thus, the simulator can answer every key-reveal query without aborting, but still learn something when the adversary choses that identity for the challenge ciphertext. In this sense, Gentry's IBE system follows the universal hash proof paradigm of Cramer and Shoup [12] : Given a well-formed ciphertext, all the decryption keys recover the same message, but they recover different messages when the ciphertext is mal-formed (in a certain sense). The adversary is assumed to have a non-negligible advantage when the challenge ciphertext is well-formed, but has essentially no advantage (statistically) when it is mal-formed; the adversary's different behavior in these cases allows the simulator to solve the underlying decision problem. Gentry's reduction uses an underlying hard problem that has a large problem instance (size θ(q)), to ensure that the adversary cannot use its q key-reveal queries to determine what keys the simulator possesses for the target identity. In this work we extend Gentry's IBE system and proof to the case of a HIBE.
Constructing HIBE, Step 1: From IBBE to HIBE
In our quest to construct HIBE, we use as an intermediate step a specific type of identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE). An IBBE system can be seen as somewhere in between regular IBE and HIBE: It allows a sender to encrypt a message to a set identities, and each member of this set can use its own key to decrypt the message. This is somewhat similar to HIBE, in that encryption is targeted at a group of identities (similarly to the identity vector in HIBE). 1 However, IBBE is simpler than HIBE since decryption keys correspond only to single identities (see Section 2.2).
As a first step in constructing HIBE systems, we provide a generic transformation from IBBE to HIBE. This transformation, however, requires an "augmented IBBE system" that also has decryption keys corresponding to sets of identities (for decrypting ciphertexts that were encrypted for these sets). Specifically, we require a key-randomizable identity based broadcast encryption (KR-IBBE), where it is possible to generate a uniformly random decryption key K S for a set of identities S from any decryption key K S for S S (see Section 2.3). KR-IBBE is rather close to HIBE, but a major difference is that security is defined with respect to an adversary that can only ask for decryption keys corresponding to single identities, not for sets of identities. Hence it is still simpler to design KR-IBBE and use our transformation than to design a HIBE "from scratch."
Constructing HIBE, Step 2: Constructing KR-IBBE
Even with the simplification of KR-IBBE, our construction and its proof are still rather complex. Part of the reason for the complexity of our system and proof stems from the inherent tension between the key-randomization requirement and the Cramer-Shoup proof paradigm: On one hand, key-randomization implies in particular that one can generate a random decryption key for an identity set S from any fixed valid encryption key for the same set. On the other hand, the Cramer-Shoup paradigm require that the simulator be able to generate only a small subset of the decryption keys for the target identity set.
Our proof resolves this tension by going through an intermediate step in which we replace the full-randomization requirement with "pseudo-randomization": Namely, from each fixed valid encryption key we can only generate a small subset of the decryption keys, but this small subset still looks random. In our case, the difference between "fully-random" and "pseudo-random" keys is that "fully random" keys are taken from some linear space and "pseudo-random" keys are taken from a proper subspace of this linear space. Being linear spaces of group elements, these are indistinguishable under the Decision Linear Assumption [4] .
We prove the security of the "pseudo-random" system using techniques and hard problems analogous to those used by Gentry and Waters in [15] , but we we need to make rather substantial modifications to the system given in [15] . (Most notably we cannot have scalars in the decryption key, so we must convert all the parameters, decryption keys, and ciphertexts into vectors of group elements.)
Organization
We begin in Section 2 below by introducing the formal definitions of HIBE, IBBE, and KR-IBBE, and then in Section 3 we describe and prove our transformation from KR-IBBE to HIBE. We then move to constructing KR-IBBE, first presenting in Section 4 the notations, tools, and assumptions on which we base out construction, and then describing the construction itself in Section 5. The proof of security is presented in Section 6.
HIBE and IBBE: Definitions
For simplicity, we define our encryption systems as key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The standard transformation from KEM to encryption is ignored here.
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
A HIBE system consists of the following five procedures:
Setup(λ, ) Takes as input a security parameter λ and the hierarchy depth . It outputs a public key P K and a master secret key SK. The public key implies also a key space K(P K) and an identity space ID(P K), and hierarchical identities are (ordered) tuples in ID(P K) ≤ . KeyGen(P K, SK, ID) Takes as input the public key P K and master secret key SK, and an identity vector ID = [ID 1 , . . . , ID t ] ∈ ID(P K) ≤ . It outputs a decryption key K ID for ID. KeyDerive(P K, ID, K ID , ID ) Takes as input the public key P K, the identity vector ID and corresponding decryption key K ID , and another vector ID such that ID is a prefix of ID . It outputs a decryption key K ID for ID . KEM(P K, ID) Takes as input the public key P K and identity vector ID. It outputs a pair (K, C),
where K is the KEM key (from the key space K(P K)) and C is the ciphertext. Decrypt(P K, C, ID, K ID ) Takes as input the public key P K, ciphertext C, identity vector ID and corresponding decryption key K ID . It outputs the corresponding KEM key K (or an error message ⊥).
We require the usual "completeness", namely that decryption with the correct decryption key always recovers the correct KEM key. In particular, setting (P K, SK) ← Setup(λ, ) and fixing any chain of identity vectors ID 1 ,ID 2 ,. . .,ID t with each ID i a prefix of ID i+1 , if we set K ID 1 ← KeyGen(P K, SK, ID 1 ) and then K ID i ← KeyDerive(P K, ID i , K ID i−1 , ID i ) for i = 2, . . . , t and (K, C) ← KEM(P K, ID t ), then we have Decrypt(P K, C, ID t , K IDt ) = K (with probability one).
Security. 2 Chosen-plaintext security for a HIBE system E against an adversary A is defined by the following game between A and a "challenger": Both A and the challenger are given the parameters λ, as inputs.
Setup: The challenger chooses a "challenge bit" σ ∈ R {0, 1}, runs (P K, SK) ← E.Setup(λ, ), and gives P K to A.
Key-Reveal:
The adversary A makes adaptive key-reveal queries to the challenger, each consisting of an identity vector ID = [ID 1 , . . . , ID t ] ∈ ID(P K) ≤ . If the adversary already made the challenge query and ID is a prefix of the target identity ID * then the challenger ignores this query, and otherwise it returns to the adversary the decryption key K ID ← E.KeyGen(P K, SK, ID).
Challenge: The adversary queries the challenger with the target identity vector ID * = [ID * 1 , . . . , ID * t ] ∈ ID(P K) ≤ . If the adversary already made a challenge query before, or if it made a key-reveal query for any prefix of the target identity ID * then the challenger ignores this query. Otherwise the challenger sets (K 1 , C) ← E.KEM(P K, ID * ), chooses another key at random from the key space K 0 ∈ R K(P K), and returns (K σ , C) to the adversary (where σ is the challenge bit chosen during Setup).
The adversary can make many Key-Reveal queries and one Challenge query, in whatever order. Then it halts, outputting a guess σ for the bit σ. The HIBE advantage of A is
Definition 1 (CPA-secure HIBE). The system E is CPA-secure if for any efficient adversary A and any = poly(λ) it holds that AdvHIBE E A (λ, (λ)) is negligible in λ. CCA-security is defined similarly, where the adversary can also make decryption queries (except for decrypting the target ciphertext by the target identity vector).
Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) is somewhat similar to HIBE, in that encryption is targeted at a group of identities (similarly to the identity vector in HIBE). However, IBBE is simpler than HIBE, since decryption keys correspond to a single identity. Formally, an IBBE system consists of the following procedures:
Setup(λ, ) Takes as input a security parameter λ and an upper bound on the group size . It outputs a public key P K (that implies a keys space K(P K) and an identity space ID(P K)) and a master secret key SK. KeyGen(P K, SK, ID) Takes as input the public key P K, master secret key SK, and an identity ID ∈ ID(P K). It outputs a decryption key K ID for ID. KEM(P K, S) Takes as input the public key P K and a set of identities S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID t } (with t ≤ ). It outputs a pair (K, C), where K is the KEM key (from key space K(P K)) and C is the ciphertext. Decrypt(P K, C, S, ID, K ID ) Takes as input the public key P K, ciphertext C, identity set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID t } (with t ≤ ) and the decryption key K ID for some ID ∈ S. It outputs the corresponding KEM key K (or an error message ⊥).
We require that setting (P K, SK) ← Setup(λ, ) and fixing any set of identities S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID t } ⊂ ID(P K) ≤ , if we set K ID 1 ← KeyGen(P K, SK, ID 1 ) and (K, C) ← KEM(P K, S), then we have Decrypt(P K, C, S, K ID 1 ) = K (with probability one).
Security. Chosen-plaintext security IBBE is similar to the corresponding definition for HIBE, with the main difference being that the adversary can only make key-reveal queries for single identities rather than identity-vectors. Let E be an IBBE system, CPA-security against an adversary A is defined by the following game between A and a "challenger": Both A and the challenger are given the parameters λ, as inputs.
Key-Reveal:
The adversary A makes adaptive key-reveal queries to the challenger. Each keyreveal query consists of an identity ID ∈ ID(P K). If the adversary already made the challenge query and ID ∈ S * then the challenger ignores this query, and otherwise it returns K ID ← E.KeyGen(P K, SK, ID) to the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary queries the challenger with the target identity set S * = {ID * 1 , . . . , ID * t } ∈ ID(P K) ≤ . If the adversary already made a challenge query before, or if made a keyreveal query for any identity ID ∈ S * , then the challenger ignores this query. Otherwise the challenger sets (K 1 , C) ← E.KEM(P K, ID * ), chooses another key at random from the key space K 0 ∈ R K(P K), and returns (K σ , C) to the adversary (where σ is the bit chosen during Setup).
The adversary can make many Key-Reveal queries and one Challenge query, in whatever order. Then it halts, outputting a guess σ for the bit σ. The IBBE advantage of A is
Definition 2 (CPA-secure IBBE). The system E is CPA-secure if for any efficient adversary A and any = poly(λ) it holds that AdvHIBE E A (λ, (λ)) is negligible in λ. CCA-security is defined similarly, where the adversary can also make decryption queries (except for decrypting the target ciphertext by any of the identities in the target set).
Key-Randomizable IBBE
To construct HIBE systems, we will use "augmented IBBE systems" that also have decryption keys corresponding to sets of identities: A decryption key corresponding to an identity-set S makes it possible to decrypt ciphertexts that were created with respect to this set. Formally, a Key-Randomizable Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption system (KR-IBBE) is an IBBE system with extended key generation KeyGen * , extended decryption Decrypt * , and key-derivation KeyDerive, as follows:
KeyGen * (P K, SK, S) Takes as input the public key P K, master secret key SK, and an identity set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID t } ∈ ID(P K) ≤ , and outputs a decryption key K S for S. We require that KeyGen * (P K, SK, S) degenerates to the original KeyGen when S is a singleton set S = {ID}. KeyDerive(P K, S, K S , S ) Takes as input the public key P K, an identity set S and corresponding decryption key K S , and a superset S ⊇ S, and outputs a decryption key K S for S . 3 Decrypt * (P K, C, S, K S ) Takes as input the public key P K, an identity set S, ciphertext C that was generated with respect to S, and the decryption key K S for S. It outputs the KEM key K (or an error message ⊥).
We stress that we make no security requirements regarding these additional procedures: the CPAsecurity game is still defined with respect to the original four procedures Setup,KeyGen,KEM, Decrypt. However, we do make some functionality requirements, specifically the standard "completeness" requirement on Decrypt * and a distribution requirement on KeyDerive.
The "completeness" requirement says that for any (P K, SK) ← Setup(λ, ) and any set of identities S, if we set K S ← KeyGen * (P K, SK, S) and (K, C) ← KEM(P K, S), then we get Decrypt(P K, C, S, K S ) = K (with probability one).
The distribution requirement says for any (P K, SK) ← Setup(λ, ), any two sets of identities S ⊆ S , and any decryption key K S ← KeyGen * (P K, SK, S), the output distributions of KeyGen * (P K, SK, S ) and KeyDerive(P K, S, K S , S ) are almost identical. (That is, their statistical distance is negligible in λ.)
Remark. Due to the distribution requirement above, our transformation from key-randomizable IBBE to HIBE in Section 3 results in a system where the decryption keys generated by KeyDerive have the same distribution as the ones generated by KeyGen. Hence, the delegation issue in the HIBE definition, which was noted by Shi and Waters [19] , does not apply to our system. Namely, proving security with respect to our Definition 1 implies also security with respect to the more complicated definition from [19] .
From Key-Randomizable IBBE to HIBE
The transformation from key-randomizable IBBE to HIBE is quite straightforward: we use collisionresistant hashing to map identity-vectors to identity-sets, and then just use each of the procedures Setup, KeyGen * , KeyDerive, KEM, Decrypt * as-is.
The only non-trivial aspect of this transformation is the security reduction, since the HIBE adversary can make key-reveal queries on identity-vectors whereas the IBBE adversary can only ask for keys of "top level" single identities. We handle this difference by having the reduction algorithm generate decryption keys differently than is done in the system, which is where we need the distribution requirement of key randomization.
The Transformation
Let E = (Setup, KeyGen * , KeyDerive, KEM, Decrypt * ) be a key-randomizable IBBE system, and we assume that we have a "matching" collision resistant hash function H that can hash identity-vectors into the identity space of E. 4 We use H to hash identity vectors in the HIBE system into identity sets for E by setting:
Note that short of finding collisions in H, we can only get H(ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID i ) ∈ H(ID ) if (ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID i ) is a prefix of ID . Then we construct a HIBE system as follows: 5 HIBE.Setup(λ, ): Set (SK 0 , P K 0 ) ← E.Setup(λ, ). Output SK and P K, which are the same as SK 0 and P K 0 , except that each includes a description of the collision-resistant hash function H as above.
HIBE.KeyGen(P K, SK, ID): Set S ← H(ID) (as above), compute K S ← E.KeyGen * (P K 0 , SK 0 , S) and output K ID = K S .
HIBE.KeyDerive(P K, ID, K ID , ID ): Set S ← H(ID) and S ← H(ID ), and note that S ⊆ S since ID is a prefix of ID . Also let K S = K ID , compute K S ← E.KeyDerive(P K 0 , S, K S , S ) and output
HIBE.KEM(P K, S): Set S ← H(ID), compute (K, C) ← E.KEM(P K 0 , S) and output (K, C).
HIBE.Decrypt(P K, C, ID, K ID ): Set S ← H(ID), K S = K ID , and return E.Decrypt * (P K 0 , C, S, K S ).
A Tight Reduction
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a HIBE adversary A that breaks CPA security (resp. CCA security) of the HIBE construction with advantage . Then, there exists an IBBE adversary B and a collision finder B , both running in about the same time as A, such that B finds a hash function collision with some probability and B breaks the CPA security (resp. CCA security) of the underlying KR-IBBE system E with advantage − .
Proof. B attacks receives a public key P K 0 from the challenger. It sets P K to be P K 0 with the hash function H, and sends P K to A.
When A requests a HIBE key for identity vector
. B asks the IBBE challenger for the decryption key K ID t , corresponding to the last identity ID t = H(ID 1 , . . . , ID t ). If t = 1, it forward K IDt to A; else, it returns to A the decryption key
In the CCA case, B handles decryption queries in the obvious way (forwarding, after replacing ID with S = H(ID)).
When A asks for the challenge ciphertext with respect to identity vector ID * = (ID * 1 , . . . , ID * t ), B again sets S * ← H(ID * ), makes a challenge query to the IBBE challenger with target identityset S * (unless there is a hash collision, see below), and return to A whatever it got back from its challenger.
Finally, when A halts with a guess bit σ , then B forward the same bit σ to its IBBE challenger. The collision finder B proceeds just like B, except that it saves all the queries that A makes and looks for collisions of the form H(ID 1 , . . . ,
are prefixes of queries made by A). Denote by the probability that B finds any such collision.
We claim that B's simulation appears to A to be perfectly distributed as long as no collisions occur. This is true, because the distribution requirement on E.KeyDerive implies that the HIBE key that B gets for identity vector ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID t ) has almost the same distribution, regardless of whether it is obtained by KeyGen (as it would in an actual attack on the HIBE system) or by KeyDerive from {ID t } (as computed by B). Hence, the advantage of B is at least − .
Remark. Observe that the proof above only uses the fact that KeyDerive has the same distribution as KeyGen when it starts from a singleton key K {ID t } . This is because we are using here the simplistic security definition for HIBE that does not address the delegation issue. To prove the more elaborate notion of Shi and Waters [19] we would need to use the full power of the distribution requirement.
Notations and Preliminaries
We now introduce notations and hardness assumption that are used to establish our key-randomizable IBBE in Section 5. We denote the set of integers from m to n (inclusive) by [m, n]. We denote polynomials by uppercase letters in San-serif font, for example P, Q, T, etc. We use the following simple fact about polynomials: Lemma 1. For any polynomial P(x) and any scalar a, P(x) − P(a) is divisible by x − a. In other words, P(x)−P(a)
x−a is a polynomial (without denominator) of degree deg(P) − 1.
Bilinear maps and our additive notations
Our system (and its security proof) make heavy use of linear algebra. We therefore use additive notations for all the groups that are involved in the system. Specifically, we use Z q -the field of integers modulo a prime q -as our base scalar field, and we have two order-q groups that we call the source group G and target group G T , both of which can be viewed as vector spaces over Z q .
Throughout the writeup we denote elements of the source group with a hat over lowercase letters (e.g.,â,b, etc.) and elements of the target group with a tilde (ã,b, etc.). Scalars will be denoted with no decorations (e.g., a, b, and sometimes also τ, ρ, etc.)
We will make use of an efficiently computable bilinear map from the source group to the target group e : G × G → G T , such that for any two source-group elementsâ,b ∈ G and any two scalars
The neutral elements in the groups G, G T are denoted by0,0, respectively. We also denote by1 some fixed generator in G, which we consider to be part of the description of G. We require that the mapping e is non-trivial, which means that e(1,1) is a generator in G T , and we denote this generator by1 = e(1,1). More generally, for a scalar a ∈ Z q , we denote the source-group element a ·1 byâ, and the target-group element a ·1 = e(â,1) byã. Conversely, for an elementâ ∈ G, its discrete-logarithm based1 is denoted a ∈ Z q . (Readers who are used to multiplicative notations may find it easier to think ofâ,ã as denoting "a in the exponent" in the appropriate groups.) Note also that in these notations, the discrete-logarithm ofâ with respect tob is just their "ratio"â/b, which is a scalar.
With these notations, we usually omit the map e altogether, and simply denote it as a "product" of two source-group elements:â
Note that the bi-linearity of e looks in these notations just like the natural commutative property of productsûa ·vb = uv ·ãb.
Below we slightly abuse notations to denote "powers of group elements": Ifâ is a group element with discrete-logarithm a, then we denoteâ i def = a i ·1 and we callâ i the i'th power ofâ. 6
Vectors and matrices. We extend our notations to vectors and matrices: A vector of scalars is denoted with no decoration a = [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ], a vector of source-group elements denoted with a hat,â = [â 1 ,â 2 , . . . ,â n ], and a vector of source-group elements denoted with a tildeã = [ã 1 ,ã 2 , . . . ,ã n ]. All these vectors are considered row vectors. Matrices are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., A for a matrix of scalars,Â for a matrix of source-group elements, andÃ for a matrix of target-group elements. We denote the i'th row of A by A i , the sub-matrix consisting of rows i, j, k by A i,j,k , and the sub-matrix consisting of rows i through j is denoted A i..j . As usual, the transposed matrix of A is denoted A t .
We denote by span(x, y, z) the linear space that is spanned by the vectors x, y, z, and also use the same notation to denote the uniform distribution over this space. For example, we usê u ←ŵ + span(Â 1,2,4 ) as a shorthand for the process of choosing three random scalars a, b, c ∈ R Z p and settingû ←ŵ + aÂ 1 + bÂ 2 + cÂ 4 .
Inner and outer-products. For vectors a, b, we denote their inner product by a, b def = i a i b i . We use the same inner-product notations also for vectors of source-group elements, namely:
It is easy to check that all the commutative, associative, and distributive properties of inner products hold for both scalars and group elements.
Similar notations apply to matrix multiplication, for either scalar matrices or group-element matrices. For example, if A is an × m scalar matrix andB is an m × n matrix of source-group elements, then AB ∈ G[ × n] is a matrix of source-group elements whose i, j element is the inner product of the i'th row of A by the j'th column ofB. We also use a × b to denote the outer product of two vectors. Namely, the outer product of the m-vector a by the n-vector b is the m × n matrix obtained as the matrix product of the m × 1 matrix a t by the 1 × n matrix b. The same notation applies to vectors of group elements.
Linear algebra. All the standard concepts from linear algebra behave just the same with either scalars or group elements. For example, ifÂ ∈ G[n × n] is a square matrix of source-group elements and A is the matrix of the discrete logarithm of all the elements inÂ (with respect to the fixed generator1), then the inverse ofÂ isÂ −1 = A −1 ·1. (Equivalently, the inverse ofÂ is the unique matrixB such thatÂ ·B =Ĩ.) Similarly, the rank of a scalar matrix is defined as usual, and the rank of a matrix of group elements is defined as the rank of their discrete-logarithm matrix.
The BDHE-Set assumption
The BDHE-Set assumption (used also in [15] ) is a parameterized generalization of the t-BDHI problem from [1] . 7 Recall that a t-BDHI adversary is given t + 1 powers of a random source-group element,1,â,â 2 , . . .â t , and it needs to distinguish the target-group elementã −1 from random.
An instance of the BDHE-Set assumption is parameterized by a set of integers S ⊂ Z and another "target integer" m. The BDHE-Set adversary is given some powers of a random sourcegroup element, {â i : i ∈ S}, and it (roughly) needs to distinguish the target-group elementã m from random. Denoting S + q S def = {i + j mod λ(q) : i, j ∈ S}, where λ(q) is the order of elements modulo q, it is easy to see that if G is an order-q bilinear-map group and m ∈ S + q S then the problem is easy: Just choose some i, j ∈ S such that i + j = m mod λ(q) and compute the bilinear map e(â i ,â j ) =â i ·â j =ã i+j =ã m However, when m / ∈ S + q S then there does not seem to be an easy way of distinguishingã m from random given the source-group elements {â i : i ∈ S}. The formal BDHE-Set assumption below is somewhat stronger, however, giving the adversary not the target group elementã m itself, but rather two random source group elements whose product isã m . Even so, this may be a reasonable assumption to make. The (S, m)-BDHE-Set problem with respect to G and G T consists of the following experiment: Choose at random a scalar a ∈ R Z * q and a bit σ ∈ R {0, 1}. If σ = 0 then choose two random scalars z 1 , z 2 ∈ R Z * q , and if σ = 1 then choose a random scalar z 1 ∈ R Z * q and set z 2 ← a/z 1 mod q. The BDHE-Set adversary gets as inputâ i = a i ·1 for all i ∈ S and alsoẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 , and its goal is to guess the bit σ. The advantage of an adversary A is defined as
Informally, the asymptotic Decision BDHE-Set assumption states that for any m / ∈ S + S and a large enough prime q, efficient adversaries (that work in time poly(|S|, log q) only have insignificant advantage in the experiment from above. Making this formal is rather straightforward (though getting the quantification right takes some care).
Jumping ahead, for our system we use the assumption above with the target integer m = −1 and the set S defined as:
where is the depth of the identity-hierarchy of the system and h is some other parameter. (Specifically, if q * is a bound on the number of queries then h = q * + + 2.) This set S is depicted in Figure 1 , which makes it clear that S + S indeed does not include the target integer m = −1. 
The Linear Assumption
The decision linear assumption, first defined in [4] , states (in our additive notations) that given the six source group elementsâ,b,ĉ,d,ê,f , it is hard to distinguish the case where these elements are completely random from the case where they are chosen at random subject to the condition f /ĉ =ê/b+d/â. (I.e., the discrete logarithm of f relative to c is the sum of the discrete logarithm of e relative to b and the discrete logarithm of d relative to a.) Note that this assumption is equivalent to saying that given the matrix of group elements
it is hard to decide if this matrix is invertible or has rank two. In this work we use a slightly weaker variant of this assumption, only assuming that given a 3 × 3 matrix of source-group elements, it is hard to distinguish the case where this is a random invertible matrix from the case where it is a random rank-two matrix. (This weaker assumption is implied both by the standard linear assumption and by our BDHE-Set assumption, but we make it a separate assumption just to make the exposition of our security-proof easier.)
A Key-Randomizable IBBE system
Our system operates in prime-order bilinear-map groups. In the description below we assume that these order-q groups are fixed "once and for all" and everyone knows their description. (An alternative description will include the group-generation as part of the Setup procedure.) We also fix the hierarchy-depth of the system to some integer .
The identity space of the system is the scalar field Z q , except that we have "forbidden identities" within this range: − 1 of them are arbitrary (and we set them to be 0, 1, . . . , − 2), and the last one is a random scalar a that is chosen during Setup (see below).
Setup: Choose three random scalars a, b, s ∈ Z q and a random invertible matrix A ∈ G[7 × 7], and setB = (Â −1 ) t . We note that the system only uses the top four rows ofÂ and five rows ofB. The seventh dimension is only used in the security proof. Below we denote by a i the vector a i def = [1 a a 2 . . . a i ].
-The master secret key is SK = (B 1..6 , s, a ).
-The public key consists of three parts, P K = (P K 1 , P K 2 , P K 3 ) with P K 1 consisting of a target-group element that is used to compute the KEM key, P K 2 consisting of multiples of the rows ofÂ that are used to compute the ciphertext, and P K 3 consisting of multiples of the rows ofB that are used only for key randomization. Specifically we have
KeyGen (P K, SK, ID): Choose a key of 3 − 3 7-dimensional vectors of source-group elements as follows: Pick at random r ID ∈ Z q and setK ID = (û ID ,V ID ,Ŵ ID ,X ID ,ŷ ID ), wherê
Note that theŴ ID component is the same for all identities (so it really belongs in the public key). It is included in the secret key only for the purpose of the key-randomization procedure below.
KEM (P K, S):
If |S| < then add to S the first −|S| of the "forbidden identities" 0, 1, .... Denote the resulting identities by {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID }.
-Set the monic degree-polynomial P(x) 
The implied KEM key is the target-group elementk = t · P K 1 = a −1 ts.
Remark. Note that the ciphertext include seven source group elements and scalars (to specify F). The ciphertext size can be reduced in a particular way, so that when encrypting to a set S of size m < we only have m scalars in the ciphertext: Instead of choosing F completely at random, we impose the condition that F(ID) = 1 for each of the "forbidden identities" that were added to S. This way, the encryptor can specify F using only the m scalars F(ID i ) for all ID i ∈ S. This optimization requires a small change to the proof of security, see remark at the end of Section 6.
We also note that we can get a constant-size ciphertext by moving to the random-oracle model: the encryptor just sends some nonce, and F is determined by applying the random oracle to this nonce.
Decrypt (P K, (F,ĉ), S, ID,K ID ), where ID ∈ S. If |S| < then add to S the first − |S| of the "forbidden identities" 0, 1, .... Denote the resulting identities by {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID }. Parse the key asK ID = (û ID ,V ID ,Ŵ ID ,X ID ,ŷ ID ), recalculate the monic -degree polynomial P(x) = i=1 (x − ID i ), and do the following:
Finally, recover the KEM key ask = ĉ,d ID .
Correctness
To argue correctness, we can rewritê
Further developing the coefficient ofB 1 we get
Examining the inner-product ofĉ withd ID , we use the fact that Â i ,B j is either 0 (when i = j) or1 (when i = j). Hence the span's ofÂ 4 and ofB 5,6 drop out completely, and we are left with the product of the matching coefficients only:
The first term in the parenthesis above can be simplified using Q ID (a) = P(a)/(a − ID), so we get
= a −1 ts ·1 =k
Key randomization
Our key-randomization follows Boyen's idea from [8] , where the key for identity-set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID m } consists of m "shifted versions" of the keys, r ID 1K ID 1 , . . ., r IDnK IDm , such that i r ID i = 1 (mod q). Namely, the augmented procedure KeyGen * (P K, SK, S) uses the same KeyGen procedure from above m times to getK . Below we callK ID i the singleton key corresponding to ID i , and r ID iK ID i is the shifted singleton key for ID i . 8 Note that for the special case m = 1, we have r ID = 1, so KeyGen * degenerates to the original KeyGen.
Extended decryption. The extended decryption procedure Decrypt * is given a ciphertext (F,ĉ) together with a set of identities S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID m } (m ≤ ) and a matching decryption keyK S . It parses the decryption key asK S = [K ID 1 , . . . ,K IDm ] where theK ID i 's are shifted singleton keys. Namely we haveK ID i = r ID iK ID i where theK ID i 's are singleton keys and i r ID i = 1 (mod q).
Then we use each shifted singleton key to produced ID i just as in Eq. (5), setsd S = id ID i , and recoverk = ĉ,d S .
Correctness holds since the decryption process in linear: Denote byd ID i the vector that would have been obtained from the singleton keyK ID i using Eq. (5). Then on one hand decryption is linear so we haved ID i = r ID id ID i . On the other hand by correctness of the basic decryption procedure we know that ĉ,d ID i =k. We therefore get
=k Key derivation. Key-derivation uses Boyen's idea of reciprocal keys [8] . Namely, given the public key and any two identities ID 1 and ID 2 , anyone can compute a pair of shifted singleton keys δK ID 1 and δK ID 2 for the same (unknown) scalar factor δ. The procedure for generating these reciprocal keys (which is used as a subroutine for key derivation) is as follows:
ReciprocalKeys (P K, ID 1 , ID 2 ): recall that the public key P K depends on the unknown scalars a, b, s (among other things).
-Choose at random z ∈ Z q . The shifted singleton keys δK ID i will have δ = bz(a − ID 1 )(a − ID 2 ).
-Choose at random r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q (which will play the role of r ID 1 and r ID 2 in the reciprocal keys).
and similarly for δK ID 2 (using r 2 instead of r 1 and swapping the roles of ID 1 , ID 2 ). Notice that the terms a i bB j for i ∈ [0, ],j = 1, 2, 3, as well as bsB 1 , absB 1 , a +1 bB 3 , andB 5, 6 , are all part of the P K 3 component of the public key.
From the description above it is clear that when ID 1 , ID 2 = a, then ReciprocalKeys indeed returns the correct distribution, namely two shifted singleton keys δK ID 1 , δK ID 2 where eachK ID is drawn from the same distribution as the singleton keys for ID in KeyGen and δ is chosen at random in Z q (and independently ofK ID 1 ,K ID 2 ).
KeyDerive (P K, S,K S , S ) (where S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID m } and S ⊆ S ). Assume (w.l.o.g.) that S consists of the first n identities in S , namely S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } with n ≤ m. DenoteK S = {K ID 1 , . . . ,K IDn }, whereK ID i is the shifted singleton key for ID i (consisting of 3 − 3 7-dimensional vectors of source-group elements). For i = 1, . . . , m, run the ReciprocalKeys procedure from above with identities ID i and ID i+1 (indexing mod m) to get two shifted singleton keys for these ID's, which we denote byL ID i ,M ID i+1 , respectively. Namely, set Proof. Observe that every 7-vector in a singleton keyK ID corresponding to identity ID (as computed by KeyGen) is of the form (expr(a, s, ID) + r ID expr (a, s, ID)) ·B k where r ID is the scalar that was chosen for this singleton key,B k is one specific row of the matrix B, and expr(a, s, ID), expr (a, s, ID) are two fixed scalar-valued expressions that depend only on the scalars a, s from the master secret key and on the identity ID. (Note that either expr(a, s, ID) or expr (a, s, ID) can be zero, but not both.) Considering the same vector in all the shifted singleton keys inK S , we have a collection of n vectors,x 1 , . . . ,x n , wherex
where the scalars r ID i satisfy i r ID i = 1. For notational convenience, for i ∈ [n + 1, m] we denote
= 0 andx i =0 (so we still havex i 's of the right format with i r ID i = 1, even when we consider all m elements).
Similarly considering the same vector in all the shifted singleton keys that are generated by ReciprocalKeys, we have vectorsŷ 1 . . .ŷ m (from theL ID i 's) andẑ 1 . . .ẑ m (from theM ID i 's) of the formŷ
where all the scalars δ i , ρ i , τ i , i = 1 . . . m, are chosen at random in Z q (and indexing is mod m, so δ 0 = δ m ). Hence the corresponding element in the shifted singleton keyK * ID i iŝ
Assuming that r ID i + δ i − δ i−1 = 0, we can denote
and then we havex
which is of the right form, and indeed the scalars r * *
Since the δ i 's are random and independent then the r * * ID i 's are also random and independent subject to the constraint that their sum is one. Finally, assuming that none of the r * * 
Security Proof
We now prove security of our system based on the decision BDHE-Set and linear assumptions. On a very high level, the proof follows the hash-proof approach: The simulator (in Proposition 3 below) will generate the challenge ciphertext so that this is either a valid ciphertext or an invalid one, depending on whether the input of the simulator is a YES instance or a NO instance of the decision BDHE-Set problem. In our case, a valid ciphertext is spanned by the rowsÂ 1,2,3,4 , and an invalid ciphertext also has a component ofÂ 7 . The secret keys will have a randomB 7 component in them, so an invalid ciphertext will be decrypted to a random KEM key (while a valid ciphertext will always be decrypted to the "right KEM key").
We now proceed to describe the actual proof, consisting of four games: roughly, Game 0 is the actual interaction of the adversary with our system, in Game 1 we use decryption rather than encryption to compute the KEM key corresponding to the challenge ciphertext, in Game 2 we add a component ofB 7 to the secret keys, and in Game 3 we add a component ofÂ 7 to the challenge ciphertext vector. Fix an adversary A, and we denote the event that the adversary wins game i by W i , and will show that Pr[W i ] ≈ Pr[W i+1 ] and that Pr[
Game 0 is the semantic-security game from Definition 2, so Pr[W 0 ] − 1 2 is half the CPA-advantage of the adversary against our system. We describe this game for self-containment: The challenger begins by choosing a random invertible 7 × 7 scalar matrixÂ ∈ G[7 × 7] and random scalars a, b, s ∈ Z q , and setsB = (Â −1 ) t . From a, b, s,Â 1..4 andB 1..6 , the challenger computes the secret key SK = (B 1..6 , s,â ) and the public key P K = (P K 1 , P K 2 , P K 3 ) as in Eq. (2) . (Note that the challenger never uses the last three rows ofÂ in the public key or anywhere else. We will use that fact in the proof of Proposition 1 below.)
Then the challenger send P K to the IBBE adversary. When the adversary makes a key-reveal query for identity ID, the challenger runs the procedure KeyGen(SK, ID) from Section 5 to get K ID = (û ID ,V ID ,Ŵ ID ,X ID ,ŷ ID ). When the adversary makes a challenge ciphertext query for identityset S * then the challenger runs the procedure KEM(P K, S * ) to get the KEM key and ciphertext (k 1 , (F,ĉ)) = KEM(P K, S * ) It also picks another random target-group elementk 0 and a random bit σ, and returns to the adversaryk σ and (F,ĉ). (Since the KEM procedure always "pads" the set S to size , below we assume w.l.o.g. that the target set S given by the adversary is always of size exactly .) The adversary can make more key-reveal queries, and eventually it halts with output bit σ . It wins the game if it never made key-reveal query on any of the identities ID * i ∈ S * and yet it guessed correctly σ = σ. Game 1 proceeds like Game 0, except that we change the KEM procedure that the challenger uses to produce the challenge ciphertext and KEM key. Specifically, the challenger still uses the KEM procedure to get the challenge ciphertext (F,ĉ), but uses the decryption procedure to derive the KEM key. Namely, instead of deriving the corresponding KEM key ask 1 = t · a −1 sg (as done in the KEM procedure) it uses KeyGen to derive a keyK ID * 1 and computes the KEM key as k 1 = Decrypt(P K, S, (F,ĉ), ID * 1 ,K ID * 1 ).
Clearly, since decryption always recovers the correct KEM key then the same value ofk 1 is returned in either Game 0 or Game 1. These games are therefore identical and we have Pr
Game 2 proceeds like Game 1, except that all the vectorsŷ ID in the secret keys have aB 7 component in them. Specifically, the challenger setŝ
whereB 7 is the last row ofB (that so far was not used anywhere in the system). This alternative procedure for generatingŷ ID is used both in answering key-reveal queries and when deriving the keyK ID * 1 in the alternative KEM procedure that is used for answering the challenge ciphertext query. We now prove that under the decision linear assumption, the attacker cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game 2. Proposition 1. There is an adversary B for the linear problem that has advantage of at least
Proof. The linear adversary B gets a 3 × 3 matrix of source-group elementsM ∈ G[3 × 3] and it needs to decide ifM is an invertible matrix or a rank-two matrix. B chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z q [7 × 7] and computes B = (A −1 ) t . Let B 5,6,7 be the 3 × 7 matrix consisting of the last three rows of B . It setsÂ = A ·1 andB = B ·1, and then replaces the last three rowsB 5,6,7 withB 5,6,7 =M · B 5,6,7 . We letB be the matrix with top four rowsB 1,2,3,4 and bottom three rowsB 5,6,7 . Next B chooses at random also a, b, s and proceeds just like the challenger in Game 2 using a, b, s,Â 1,2,3,4 andB . It is clear that whenM is an invertible matrix then the distribution over (Â 1..4 ,B) is identical to the distribution over (Â 1..4 ,B ) , so the view of the adversary is distributed identically to Game 2.
WhenM is a rank-two matrix then except with probability 1/q, the first two rows ofM are linearly independent and the last row depends on the first two. If this is indeed the case then (a) the distribution over (Â 1..4 ,B 1..6 ) is identical to the distribution over (Â 1..4 ,B 1..6 ), and (b)B 7 is spanned byB 5,6 , so the distributions span(B 5,6 ) and r IDB 7 + span(B 5,6 ) are identical. Hence the view of the adversary is distributed identically to Game 1.
Game 3 proceeds like Game 2, except for the challenge ciphertext, to which the challenger adds anÂ 7 component. Namely, the challenger computes a vectorĉ using Eq. (4) as before, but then it chooses a random scalar t , setsĉ =ĉ + t Â 7 , and returns (F,ĉ) as the challenge ciphertext. As in Games 1 and 2, the challenger computes the KEM keyk 1 by applying the decryption procedure to the challenge ciphertext, namelyk 1 = Decrypt(P K, S, (F,ĉ), ID * 1 ,K ID * 1 ). We now show that (a) the view of the adversary A in Game 3 is independent of the bit σ (and therefore Pr[W 3 ] = 1 2 ), and (b) under the decision BDHE-Set assumption the adversary cannot distinguish Game 2 from Game 3.
, whered is spanned byB 1,2,3,5,6 .
The correctness argument from Section 5.1 still applies to the vectorsĉ andd since the coefficients ofÂ 1,2,3 andB 1,2,3 are the same and all the others drop from expression, so we have ĉ ,d = t · a −1s . Also, sinceĉ ,d are orthogonal toB 7 ,Â 7 , respectively, we havẽ
Now observe that r ID * 1 is chosen by the challenger at random for the purpose of deriving the keŷ K ID * 1 when answering the challenge ciphertext query, and is never used anywhere else. It follows thatk 1 -just likek 0 -is a random target-group element, independent of anything else in the view of A. Therefore the view of A is independent of the bit σ that chooses betweenk 0 andk 1 , and so Pr[σ = σ] = 1 2 .
The main reduction
We now proceed to show that under the BDHE-Set assumption, the adversary cannot distinguish Game 2 from Game 3. Recall that the BDHE-Set problem is parametrized by a set of integers S and another integer m / ∈ S + S: The adversary gets source group elementsâ i = a i ·1 for all i ∈ S (where a is chosen at random in Z * q ), and (roughly) it cannot distinguishã m = a m ·1 in the target group from random. The formal assumption is somewhat stronger, however, giving the adversary not the target group elementã m itself, but rather two random source group elements whose product isã m . Namely, the adversary getsẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 such that either theẑ i 's are random or they satisfyẑ 1ẑ2 =ã m .
Below we set the parameters S and m as needed for the reduction. The main challenge is to make the set S "large enough" so the simulator can produce the entire view of the adversary from the elements {â i : i ∈ S} that it knows (andẑ i ,ẑ 2 ), while at the same time ensuring that S is "small enough" so that the target integer m is not in S + S (since otherwise the problem becomes easy). Before presenting the reduction itself, we describe some tools that are used in this proof.
From BDHE-Set to linear (in)dependence. Recall that the difference between Game 2 and Game 3 is that the ciphertext vector in one is spanned byÂ 1, 2, 3, 4 and in the other it is not. We move from the BDHE-Set problem to linear dependence using the following simple trick: consider a 3 × 3 matrix over Z q :
Its determinant is det(M ) = −a n 1 z 1 z 2 + a n 2 +n 3 +n 4 , so the three rows of M are linearly dependent if and only if z 1 z 2 = a −n 1 +n 2 +n 3 +n 4 . We can therefore use n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 ∈ S and set m = −n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 . Jumping ahead, we note that the 3 × 3 sub-matrix consisting of entries 3, 4, 7 in rows A 3 , A 4 , A 7 in the proof of Proposition 3 below is exactly this matrix M .
Polynomials and resultants. The reduction to BDHE-Set below uses several polynomials in the secret scalar a (that the simulator does not know). To compute the appropriate terms, the simulator will have to use powers of the source-group elementâ from its input. It will therefore be crucial that whenever the simulator is not given some powerâ i in its input, the coefficients of a i in the relevant polynomials be zero. To this end, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (As in [15] ). Let H, P be two polynomials of degrees h and p respectively, that do not share any common roots. Then there exists a polynomial T of degree h + p − 1 that satisfies the following three conditions:
Moreover, the coefficients of T can be computed efficiently from those of H and P.
Proof. Recall that the Sylvester matrix [20] of H and P is an (h + p) × (h + p) matrix, obtained by shifting the coefficients of H and P as follows:
The determinant of S(H, P) equals the resultant of H and P, hence S(H, P) is invertible when H and P do not share any common roots. The conditions on T from above are equivalent to
hence the coefficients of T can be obtained as S(H, P) −1 · [1 0 . . . 0] t . Proposition 3. There is an adversary C for the BDHE-Set problem that has advantage at least
Proof. The BDHE-Set adversary C gets as input source-group elementsâ i = a i ·1 for all i ∈ S and two additional source-group elementsẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 . Below we call C "the simulator." On a high level, C chooses a random polynomial H(x) of high-enough degree over Z q , and derives much of the randomness that is needed from this one polynomial. Specifically, it will set s = H(a) for the master secret key, r ID = H(ID) in all the key-reveal queries, and (roughly) F = H mod P for the challenge ciphertext. Let q * be some bound on the number of key-reveal queries and be the depth of the hierarchy, then the degree of H (which we denote by h) must be at least h ≥ + q * + 2, since we need to handle q * key-reveal queries, one more key-derivation to generate the KEM key in the challenge ciphertext query, degrees of freedom for the polynomial F, and one more degree of freedom for s.
In addition to the h-degree polynomial H, the simulator also chooses a random invertible matrix R ∈ Z q [7 × 7] , and a random scalar β. It will set up a simulation using the a term from its input, b = βa 3h+3 , s = H(a), and the matrices
One can check that these matrices satisfy the following conditions:
-A 1,2,3,4 are linearly independent and so are B 1,2,3,5,6,7 ; -A i , B i = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and A i , B j = 0 for all i = j; -If z 1 z 2 = a −1 then A 7 = a − A 3 + z 1 a − +1 A 4 and A 7 , B 7 = 0; -If z 1 z 2 = a −1 then A 7 is independent of A 1,2,3,4 and A 7 , B 7 = 0.
Moreover, since R is a random invertible matrix, then A, B above are random subject to these conditions.
The public key. The simulator provides the adversary a public key which is consistent with the matrices A 1..4 , B 1,2,3,5,6 above. However, the simulator C does not know a, so it uses its input (which includesâ i for i ∈ S) to compute the powers ofâ that are needed for this public key. This implies the some constraints on the set of indexes S as follows:
-The simulator must be able to produce the target group element a −1s = a −1 H(a) ·1. This means that the interval [ − 1, h + − 1] must be "covered" by S + S. -The other components of the public key consist of source-group elements, which the simulator must compute from the powers ofâ that it is given in its input. Specifically, we need the following:
To be able to compute the terms S must include a iÂ
{0} Summing up these conditions:
Key-reveal queries. On a key-reveal query for identity ID, the simulator verifies that ID = a (otherwise it have learned a and it can abort the simulation and directly solve the decision problem). 
Again, to compute these values the simulator C needs to use powers ofâ from its input, which implies the following conditions on S:
To be able to compute the terms S must include
{0, − 1} Summing up these conditions:
The target ciphertext. When the adversary asks for the target ciphertext with target identities {ID * 1 , . . . , ID * }, the simulator C first verifies that ID * i = a for all i. (Otherwise it can abort the simulation and directly solve the decision problem.) Then, C also verifies that H(ID * i ) = 0 for all i, and that the adversary never made a key-reveal query for any of the ID * i 's, and otherwise it aborts and outputs a random bit.
The simulator sets the polynomial P(x) = i (x − ID * i ), and by the verification steps above we know that H(x), P(x) have no common root. By Lemma 3, there exists a polynomial T of degree h + − 1 such that (a) the coefficient of x h in the polynomial T(x)H(x) is one; (b) the coefficients of x i for i ∈ [h + 1, h + − 1] in T(x)H(x) are all zero; and (c) the coefficients of x j for j ∈ [ , h + − 1] in T(x)P(x) are all zero. Moreover, C can efficiently compute the polynomial T from H and P. The simulator factors the polynomial T, checking that none of its roots is the secret scalar a. (If it is then the simulator can abort the simulation and directly solve the decision problem.)
Then the simulator C chooses random scalars ρ, τ and sets the following polynomials
Then it computeŝ
and sets the target ciphertext (F,ĉ). Next the simulator derives the keyK ID * 1 just as in the keyreveal queries above and uses it to recover the KEM key, settingk 1 = Decrypt(P K, {ID * 1 , . . . , ID * }, (F,ĉ), ID * 1 ,K ID * 1 ). Finally, it chooses another random target group elementk 0 and a random bit σ, and returns to the adversary the target ciphertext (F,ĉ) and the keyk σ .
The set S. As before, also in the target-ciphertext query the simulator must use the powers of a from its input to computeĉ, hence we get some more conditions on S. Before describing these conditions, however, we examine the coefficients of the polynomials Q 1,2,3 . 
where the quotient polynomial Q * (x) is of degree h − . Now, we know that all the coefficients of This set S is depicted in Figure 1 Concluding the simulation. When the adversary halts with output bit σ , the simulator also halts, outputting 1 if σ = σ and 0 otherwise.
Analysis of the main reduction
Having shown that the simulator can actually carry out the simulation from above efficiently, it is left to show that the advantage of the simulator is solving BDHE-Set is as promised. Note that if any of the identities that the adversary specifies happens to be equal to a, or if a is a root of the polynomial T, then the simulator will solve the BDHE-Set instance correctly. Below we therefore assume that this never happens. Similarly, we assume that the adversary never asks a key-reveal query for any of the target identities ID * i (since this preclude the adversary from winning). With these assumptions, we begin by arguing that the probability of the simulator aborting is small. If the adversary never asks about the identity a, then the simulator only aborts if one of the target identities ID * i happens to be a root the polynomial H. But prior to specifying the target identities, the only information that the adversary has on H is the values that it takes s = H(a) and r ID = H(ID) for the ID's from the key-revel queries. As H has high-enough degree (more than q * + 1), it follows that the values that it takes on any other point (including on each of the ID * i 's) is random. Thus the probability that any specific target identity is a root of H is 1/q, and by the union bound the probability that the simulator aborts is at most /q.
Next we assume that none of the target identities is a root of H and prove that the view of the adversary has the right distribution. Namely, the view of the adversary in this simulation is as in Game 2 when the BDHE-Set input is a YES instance, and as in Game 3 when it is a NO instance. We have already argued that the matrices A 1,2,3,4 and B 1,2,3,5,6,7 that are used for the public and secret keys are drawn from the right distribution. This is also true of the scalars a (from the input) and b (since it depends on the random β that the simulator chose) and of s = H(a) (since H is random). Hence the public key in the simulation has the correct distribution.
Let ID 1 , . . . , ID q * be the identities that the adversary asks in key-reveal queries, and ID * 1 , . . . , ID * the ones specified in the target-ciphertext query. Note that all of these identities are distinct and they all different from a (or else the simulator aborts). Since H is a random polynomial of degree h ≥ q * + + 1, then all the values H(a), H(ID i ), H(ID * j ) are random and independent. As the public key in the simulation depends on H only via H(a), it follows that H(ID i ) and H(ID * j ) are random and independent of the public key. Since the simulator uses r ID = H(ID) for key-reveal queries, it follows that the secret keys that it returns in these queries have the correct distribution. Moreover, note that the ID * j 's are roots of P, so for all j ∈ [1, ] we have F(ID * j ) = (ρH mod P)(ID * j ) = ρH(ID * j ) − Q * (ID * j )P(ID * j ) = ρH(ID * j )
Thus all the values F(ID * j ) are random and independent of the public key and the secret keys in the simulation, and thus F itself is a random degree-( − 1) polynomial, independent of these keys. Moreover, due to the random factor of ρ then F is also independent of the value of r ID * 1 = H(ID * 1 ) (since we assume H(ID * 1 ) = 0). So far we demonstrated that the distribution of the public key, the secret keysK ID in reveal queries, the secret keyK ID * 1 in the target-ciphertext query, and the polynomial F are drawn from the correct distribution. All that is left to show is that the vectorĉ also has the right distribution.
Here we have two cases, depending on whether the BDHE-Set input in the simulation is a YES instance or a NO instance.
Case 1: a YES instance. In this case, the elementsẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 satisfy ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 = a −1 ·1, which implies thatÂ 7 ∈ a − Â 3 + span(Â 4 ), so we can re-write the ciphertext vector aŝ where t is random and independent of anything else (since τ is random and T(a) = 0). Case 2: a NO instance. Observe thatÂ 7 (and therefore z 1 ) are used in the simulation only when producing the ciphertext vectorĉ, so we can think of z 1 as chosen at random only then.
Assuming that a = 0 and z 2 = 0, we consider the vector A 7 = (0 0 0 0 0 0 1 z 2 ) · R (where R is the random invertible matrix chosen by the simulator at the beginning). This vector is orthogonal to B 1,2,3,5,6 , and it satisfies A 7 , B 7 = 1. Note that we have
and therefore choosing z 1 at random is equivalent to choosing a random scalar µ and setting A 7 = a − A 3 + a −1 z 2 A 4 + µA 7 . The process of choosingĉ in the simulation is therefore equivalent to choosing a random µ and settinĝ c = τ a −h− Q 1 (a)Â 1 + Q 2 (a)Â 2 + Q 3 (a)Â 3 + ρτ a − Â 3 + span(Â 4 ) ĉ + ρτ µ t Â 7
We have shown above (in the YES instance case) thatĉ is distributed as in Game 2, and thereforeĉ is distributed as in Game 3. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3, and therefore also concludes the security proof of our system.
